- Title
- Coalitional manipulation for Schulze's rule
- Creator
- Gaspers, Serge; Kalinowski, Thomas; Narodytska, Nina; Walsh, Toby
- Relation
- 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013). Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (Saint Paul, MN 6-10 May, 2013) p. 431-438
- Relation
- ARC.DE120101761
- Relation
- http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2013/forms/contents.htm
- Publisher
- International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
- Resource Type
- conference paper
- Date
- 2013
- Description
- Schulze’s rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like monotonicity and Condorcet consistency, which it satisfies. We identify a potential shortcoming of Schulze’s rule: it is computationally vulnerable to manipulation. In particular, we prove that computing an unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) is polynomial for any number of manipulators. This result holds for both the unique winner and the co-winner versions of UCM. This resolves an open question in [14]. We also prove that computing a weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM) is polynomial for a bounded number of candidates. Finally, we discuss the relation between the unique winner UCM problem and the co-winner UCM problem and argue that they have substantially different necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a successful manipulation.
- Subject
- social choice; voting; manipulation
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1318969
- Identifier
- uon:23745
- Identifier
- ISBN:9781450319935
- Language
- eng
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